- This is a 'front-port' of the already existing patch on v1.21 and
v1.20, but applied on top of what Gitea has done to rework the LTA
mechanism. Forgejo will stick with the reworked mechanism by the Forgejo
Security team for the time being. The removal of legacy code (AES-GCM) has been
left out.
- The current architecture is inherently insecure, because you can
construct the 'secret' cookie value with values that are available in
the database. Thus provides zero protection when a database is
dumped/leaked.
- This patch implements a new architecture that's inspired from: [Paragonie Initiative](https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies).
- Integration testing is added to ensure the new mechanism works.
- Removes a setting, because it's not used anymore.
(cherry picked from commit e3d6622a63)
(cherry picked from commit fef1a6dac5)
(cherry picked from commit b0c5165145)
- Add the experimental
[deacode](https://pkg.go.dev/golang.org/x/tools/internal/cmd/deadcode)
linter to Forgejo.
- To deal with false positives that can happen due to build tags or with code
that's currently only referenced by test code, the output of the tool is
compared against a known-good output.
- This commit doesn't make any attempt to remove any deadcode.
(cherry picked from commit ac462279e9)
(cherry picked from commit b5ea6e85ac)
(cherry picked from commit 5915f3643c)
[CLEANUP] Remove deadcode
- This is deadcode since https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/1802
removed the usage of it.
(cherry picked from commit d840b9923e)
(cherry picked from commit 9442bab626)
(cherry picked from commit 0de9d18863)
